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Abstract
This article studies how social insurance programs shape individual’s incentives to take up
registered employment and to report earnings to the tax authorities. The analysis is based on a
social insurance reform in Uruguay that extended healthcare coverage to the dependent children
of registered private-sector workers. The identification strategy relies on a comparison between
individuals with and without dependent children before and after the reform. The reform increased
benefit-eligible registered employment by 1.6 percentage points (about 5 percent above the pre-
reform level), mainly due to an increase in labor force participation rather than to movement from
unregistered to registered employment. The shift was greater for parents with younger children and
for cohabiting adults whose partners’ jobs did not provide the couples’ children with access to the
benefit. Finally, the reform increased the incidence of underreporting of salaried earnings by about
4 percentage points (25 percent higher than the pre-reform level), mostly for workers employed at
small firms. The increase in fiscal revenue from higher levels of registered employment was several
orders of magnitude greater than the loss of revenue due to an increase in underreporting.
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1 Introduction
A large body of research on labor and public economics has examined the effects of social
insurance and social welfare programs on incentives in the labor market. Most of the em-
pirical literature has focused on behavioral responses to social insurance benefits (Krueger
and Meyer, 2002) and to in-work benefits (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Moffitt, 2003;
Eissa and Hoynes, 2006). In many studies, emphasis has been placed on the financial
incentive effects of labor force participation. The effects of responses on additional mar-
gins such as registered and unregistered employment and on underreporting of earnings
to evade payroll taxes has received less attention (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002; Sandmo,
2012; Slemrod and Weber, 2012). Understanding what leads firms and their employees
to register with the formal system and to declare their true income to the government
are first order public finance issues for most economies around the world. For developing
and middle-income countries, this is an important issue because of widespread tax non-
compliance, poor enforcement of regulations, and low levels of social insurance coverage.
Higher levels of registered employment and more reporting of income subject to payroll
taxes would result in increased access to social insurance for workers and their families.
Moreover, a reduction in tax non-compliance could also help remedy a variety of market
distortions that limit economic growth and economic development (La Porta and Shleifer,
2008; Levy, 2008). This issue is also relevant in advanced economies with smaller but still
sizeable underground sectors (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Schneider, 2005).
This paper contributes to these discussions by exploring how social insurance programs
shape individuals’ incentives to take up registered employment and to alter the reporting
of earnings to the tax authorities. This question is addressed empirically by examining
a large-scale policy change in Uruguay’s social insurance system. In this system, most
benefits are made available only to employees registered with the social insurance admin-
istration who pay contributions and payroll taxes. Until 2007, a health insurance benefit
was in place according to which the social insurance administration covered the employee’s
insurance premium from a private healthcare provider. However, the plan did not cover
the employee’s family. The 2008 reform extended the healthcare coverage funded by the
SIA to include all registered employees’ dependent children under the age of 18. The
reform also increased the payroll tax contribution deducted from employees’ salaried earn-
ings, although, as described in detail below, the market value of the extended benefit was
substantially greater than the increase in the tax liability for most workers with children.
This health insurance benefit extension (HIBEX) reform modified several margins of
adjustment for eligible individuals (i.e., adults with dependent children). The reform
introduced incentives to move into benefit-eligible employment (i.e., 25 hours or more
per week at a registered job) to take advantage of the subsidy for dependent children’s
insurance premiums. The new benefit created an additional incentive for those not working
to enter benefit-eligible employment, for those working in unregistered employment to
formalize, and for registered workers below the 25-hour cut-off to increase their declared
hours of work per week to at least 25.
The identification strategy relies on the fact that childless adults were not eligible for
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the benefit extension. The reform’s impact can thus be estimated using a difference-in-
difference approach, comparing the behavioral responses of adults with children to that
of childless individuals before and after the reform. The analysis is based on a pool of
repeated cross-sections of a nationally representative Uruguayan household survey that
covers three years prior to and after the reform. The empirical analysis suggests that the
benefit extension had a significant effect on labor market outcomes for eligible individuals.
Specifically, the number of individuals in benefit-eligible registered employment increased
by 1.6 percentage points with respect to the comparison group, about 5 percent higher
than the pre-reform level. The evidence suggests that this aggregate effect was mostly
the result of a reduction in the number of those not working rather than a consequence
of increased work hours among registered employees below the threshold, or a movement
of unregistered workers to registered employment. The effects were substantially larger
for single parents, parents with several children, and parents with younger children, for
whom the reform represented a stronger financial incentive. For single parents, a sizeable
fraction of the effect can be attributed to movements from unregistered to registered
employment. The response from individuals in couples depended on the benefit eligibility
of their partners, with larger effects on individuals with a partner whose employment
health insurance arrangements did not already offer coverage to the couple’s children.
In addition to these responses in labor supply and employment registration, the reform
could also have affected an additional margin of non-compliance, i.e, the underreporting
of earnings to tax authorities to evade payroll tax and social insurance contributions. The
HIBEX may have affected this form of non-compliance with the tax authorities because of
the higher health insurance contribution rate (from three to six percent) and because those
entering registered employment had to face the payroll taxes associated with the whole
bundle of social insurance benefits (more than 30 percent of taxable earnings). The anal-
ysis below exploits a unique source of information on underreporting: a household survey
in Uruguay asked registered employees whether their salaried earnings were being under-
reported to the tax authorities. Based on the plausibly exogenous variation introduced
by the reform, the results presented below suggest that the extended benefit increased
the incidence of underreporting of salaried earnings for individuals with children by about
4 percentage points, almost 25 percent higher than the pre-reform level. Moreover, this
effect was confined to workers employed at small firms.
This paper contributes to the recent literature on labor supply, social insurance pro-
grams and tax compliance. First, it provides an analysis of individuals’ reactions to social
insurance policies in the labor market beyond the labor supply margin typically studied in
the empirical literature (Ben-Shalom, Moffitt and Scholz, 2011). The analysis below also
covers the effect of social insurance benefits on the registered/unregistered employment
margin of adjustment. This is related to recent studies on the effects of work-based bene-
fits such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) on formal employment (Potter Gunter,
2013). Because the EITC subsidizes only declared work, it induces individuals with low
incomes to shift more hours from informal (or unregistered) to registered employment.
This paper makes an analogous argument: since the additional benefit is only available
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through registered employment, the reform introduces an additional incentive to take up
jobs that comply with tax regulations.
Second, this paper provides evidence to show that individuals also respond to the
policy change through an additional margin of non-compliance, mainly the underreporting
of salaried earnings. While the literature on tax evasion has typically concentrated on
underreporting of self-employment income, in Uruguay (and in many other developing
and middle-income countries) only employers report workers’ salaried earnings, and they
pay the full amount of taxes due.1This analysis adds to the limited evidence currently
available on underreporting and the incentives introduced by social insurance programs.
The results presented here complement previous findings in at least two ways. On the one
hand, rather than rely on indirect evidence such as the comparison between household
income and expenditures (Tonin, 2011) or between income distributions from two separate
sources (Kumler, Verhoogen and Frias, 2012), the findings are based on direct evidence of
underreporting as stated by salaried workers. Moreover, the analysis also breaks down the
impact of the reform on underreporting by firm size. This confirms the results of recent
theoretical models (Kleven, Kreiner and Saez, 2009) and reinforces empirical findings found
for other countries, including the United States (Chetty, Friedman and Saez, 2013). The
direct evidence of adjustments to the policy reform in terms of off-the-book employment
and underreporting of salaried earnings extends the range of evidence on tax evasion
(Slemrod and Weber, 2012) and contributes to the literature that attempts to disentangle
tax evasion from real behavioral responses to policies (Chetty, 2009; Saez, Slemrod and
Giertz, 2012).
Finally, this paper provides one of the first estimations of the labor market response
to social insurance benefits in Latin America. Bosch and Manacorda (2012) survey a rela-
tively large body of empirical literature on the impact of non-contributive programs (such
as conditional cash-transfers) on labor supply. They highlight the scarcity of evidence for
the region on the effects of social insurance programs linked to registered employment.
The findings presented here are in line with the theoretical literature on the effects of
benefits tied to registered employment on individual choices between formal and informal
employment (Levy, 2008; Galiani and Weinschelbaum, 2012).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional background of
Uruguay’s social insurance system and the 2008 healthcare insurance benefit extension.
Section 3 details the work and tax evasion incentive effects introduced by the reform.
Section 4 describes the data and the identification strategy to estimate the effects of the
reform. Section 5 presents the main results on labor supply, registered employment, and
underreporting of salaried earnings. Section 6 discusses a series of robustness and specifica-
tion checks. Section 7 presents an analysis of the fiscal incidence of the reform accounting
for its behavioral effects. Section 8 concludes with a discussion of the implications of these
results for the analysis of tax and benefit systems in developing and advanced economies.
1The empirical literature on underreporting of salaried earnings is scarce in part due to a lack of data.
Moreover, this form of non-compliance is not deemed significant in developed countries because third-party
information reporting is effective in inducing compliance, as suggested by the tax law lliterature (e.g. Shaw
et al., 2010) and by empirical studies (e.g., Kleven et al., 2011).
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2 Background: Related literature and Uruguay’s social in-
surance system
2.1 Related literature
Uruguay’s health insurance benefit extension (HIBEX) is one of a number of social in-
surance benefits linked to registered employment. The analysis of its effects on the labor
market is related to a series of specific studies on benefits, work incentives and several
margins of labor supply. With respect to labor force participation, the empirical litera-
ture generally finds a reduction in employment from increased social insurance benefits.
Most of these studies, however, are related to social insurance benefits for the unemployed
(Krueger and Meyer, 2002) or for other persons outside the labor force, including the
disabled (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999). The analysis below covers these types of labor
supply responses and expands the range of outcomes to include the impact of social insur-
ance benefits on registered (i.e., on-the-book) employment and on misreporting of salaried
earnings to the tax authorities.
The benefit-employment linkage also relates this reform to the literature on in-work
welfare benefits such as the United States’ Earned Income Tax Credits and the Tempo-
rary Assistance for Needy Families (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum,
2001) and the United Kingdom’s Working Families Tax Credits (Francesconi and van der
Klauuw, 2007). Studies of these programs typically find positive and significant effects
on the extensive margin of labor supply, but the evidence is less conclusive on the in-
tensive margin of response. An exception is the study by Chetty, Friedman and Saez
(2013), who explain positive responses to the EITC in the intensive margin by means of
an identification strategy that analyzes differences in knowledge about the tax code across
neighborhoods. As in the analysis presented in this paper, most of these studies rely on
comparisons between individuals with children and childless adults who are not affected
by the policies and, hence, used as comparison groups.
This paper is also connected to the literature on the impact of extensions of welfare
systems in developing countries, particularly in Latin America (Bosch and Manacorda,
2012). While most of these studies cover non-contributive programs, such as conditional
social cash-transfer programs, this study investigates an expansion of a contributive social
insurance benefit and its implications for labor supply incentives.
Finally, this study forms part of a growing body of research performed at the intersec-
tion between the literaure on tax evasion-shadow employment and the literature on labor
supply-tax and benefits in developing and developed countries. This type of analysis is
based on Sandmo’s (1981) and Cowell’s (1985) extensions of the Allingham and Sandmo
(1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) canonical models of tax evasion. In the context of Latin Amer-
ican labor markets, Levy (2008) and Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012) model informality
(the registered-non registered employment margin) in terms of tax evasion decisions as a
function of fines and probabilities of detection. In a recent study for the United States,
Potter Gunter (2013) relies on a quasi-experimental approach based on benefit variation
by state to study the effect of the EITC on participation in regular (registered) and infor-
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mal (unregistered or off-the-book) work among individuals with low incomes. The results
indicate that higher levels of benefits in some states induce an increase in registered work
and a fall in unregistered hours, with no significant effect on the extensive margin or on
total hours worked.
The main outcome of interest in Potter Gunter’s study (2013) relates to registered
and unregistered self-employment. The analysis below studies unregistered salaried em-
ployment. Its innovation lies in examining another dimension of tax evasion, the under-
reporting of salaried earnings. The literature on tax evasion has typically focused on
underreporting of earnings from self-employment because the withholding and reporting
requirements of wage and salaried earnings make underreporting difficult (Slemrod and
Weber, 2012) and quantitatively small, particularly in the United States (Slemrod, 2007).
Most theoretical models also assume no evasion on wage and salary income (Feldman and
Slemrod, 2007). Paying a fraction (but not all) of earnings under the table is a potentially
relevant margin of adjustment. Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (2009) develop a theoretical
model where workers and firms may collude to underreport earnings to the tax authority.
The model predicts that this type of collusion may be feasible at small firms, but harder to
sustain on a larger scale. Tonin (2011) builds a theoretical model where firms and workers
collude to hide part or all of the employee’s salaried earnings to the fiscal authority “to
avoid the payment of taxes and social security contributions.” The results in this paper are
consistent with these types of models. They are also directly related to recent attempts
to empirically test their predictions by analyzing the impact of changes in taxes and ben-
efits on misreporting of social insurance contributions. Tonin (2011) presents supporting
evidence based on household income and consumption patterns in Hungary following a
hike in the minimum wage in 2001. Consistent with the model, the hike induced higher
compliance and reduced disposable income for skilled workers.
Underreporting of salaried earnings, however, might also be decided solely by the firm
rather than pursuant to collusion, especially in developing countries where there are no
third-party reporting requirements. This lack of information on reporting2 implies that
the underreporting of salaried earnings may be a quantitatively relevant issue (see Kleven
et al., 2011 for a discussion of third-party information reporting). Kumler, Verhoogen and
Fr´ıas (2012) study underreporting of earnings in Mexico by examining a pension reform
that transitioned from a pay-as-you-go system to a system based on fully funded indi-
vidual accounts. The reform gave employees an additional incentive to ensure accurate
reports of earnings by firms and to monitor their employers’ compliance with social insur-
ance contributions. A comparison of income distributions from administrative data and
household surveys reveals substantial underreporting of earnings by firms with lower levels
of underreporting for larger firms. Moreover, a difference in differences analysis compar-
ing younger cohorts (which benefit more from the reform) to older workers indicates a
significant decline in underreporting after the reform.
This paper complements these studies of underreporting in at least two ways. Instead
2Strictly speaking, this would be a lack of first-party reporting. The tax authority only has employers’
reports for most employees’ earnings. The result is the same: the tax authority does not have two sources
of information to compare.
6
of relying on comparisons between household income and expenditures or between income
distributions from two separate sources, the analysis below relies on direct evidence of
underreporting of earnings as stated by workers. Moreover, the analysis demonstrates the
impact of the reform on underreporting of salaried earnings, breaking down the effect by
firm size, as suggested in the recent literature (Chetty et al., 2013; Kleven et al., 2009).
2.2 Uruguay’s social insurance system
Uruguay has one of the oldest and most developed social insurance systems in Latin
America. The following is a review of only the aspects of that system that are most rel-
evant to this paper; for a more in-depth description, see Ferreira-Coimbra and Forteza
(2004). This system follows a European Bismark-type model, where access to most social
insurance programs is linked to registered employment and financed through payroll taxes
and contributions from registered employees. The Banco de Previsio´n Social (BPS) is
the institution in charge of most of its administration (henceforth, the social insurance
administration - SIA). It collects payroll taxes and contributions and provides social insur-
ance benefits to most private-sector employees and public-sector workers. These benefits
include retirement pension plans and a wide range of other programs, such as health insur-
ance (paying premiums to private providers), sickness benefits, unemployment insurance,
disability benefits, maternity leave and family allowances (cash transfers paid for each of
the worker’s dependent children).
Private-sector employers in Uruguay are required to register their employees with the
SIA. Both the employer and employee are required to make contributions to finance social
insurance programs. Formally, the employer deducts the employee’s contributions from her
salary and pays both the employee’s and the employer’s contributions to the SIA. Table 1,
Panel B, shows the breakdown of the SIA contributions required by law as a percentage of
the taxable salary for private-sector employers and employees. Although the total consists
of contributions to different programs, it is transferred in full by the employer to the SIA. In
many senses, then, it operates like an overall payroll tax (the paper uses contribution and
payroll tax interchangeably). This payroll tax amounted to about 31 percent of taxable
wages in 2007, the year before the reform analyzed in this paper. The social insurance
benefits are provided as an indivisible bundle, that is, workers or employers cannot opt
out of certain programs and pocket the correspondent contribution, although there are
minimum work requirements for some benefits as discussed below. Therefore registered
employment - that is, employment compliant with social insurance regulations and payroll
taxes - grants the worker access to the full bundle of benefits.
As in many middle-income countries, enforcement in Uruguay is relatively weak and
there is widespread non-compliance with social insurance regulations and evasion of the
payroll tax. This means that a substantial fraction of private-sector salaried employees
lack access to employment-related social insurance benefits. Unregistered or off-the-book
workers in Uruguay constituted about a quarter of total salaried employees in the decade
of 2000 (Gasparini and Tornarolli, 2009) and about 28 percent of private-sector employees
in 2007, as computed with microdata from the Encuesta Continua de Hogares described
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below. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as labor informality. This paper uses
a more precise terminology based on the situation of the worker with respect to the SIA.
The discussion refers to an employee’s registration status or, alternatively, to the employer
and employee’s compliance with payroll taxes and social insurance regulations.
2.3 The 2008 reform: The health insurance benefit extension (HIBEX)
Eligibility for the health insurance component of the social insurance system requires
workers to be registered with the SIA and to work 25 or more hours per week.3 Qualifying
employees have the right to select a health insurance provider in the private sector, which
are structured like HMOs in the United States. The insurance premium is paid by the
SIA. This health insurance package covers services for the worker that are similar to
those offered in the private healthcare market, usually by the same institutions. These
packages include inpatient hospital coverage, emergency room care, medical and surgical
services, maternity care, among other services. By 2007, the health insurance benefit
covered 43 percent of the labor force and approximately 66 percent of private- sector
salaried employees (figures based on the Encuesta Continua de Hogares). That year, the
SIA spent about UYU 7.4 billion (USD 471 million at the 2010 PPP adjusted exchange
rate) on health insurance premiums, which represented 13 percent of its budget and 1.4
percent of the Uruguay’s gross domestic product (Banco de Previsio´n Social, 2008). In
addition, the health insurance benefit for employees represented about 16 percent of total
healthcare expenditures in Uruguay in 2007 (Ministerio de Salud Pu´blica, 2010a).
In 2007, Uruguay’s government embarked on an ambitious overhaul of the healthcare
system, with the stated objective of strengthening three areas: healthcare coverage; health
management; and healthcare financing. The reform enacted by Uruguay’s Parliament
(Law 18,211-2007) established a series of new guidelines, regulations and institutions for
the healthcare system in order to further equitable access.
Before the 2008 reform, the health insurance benefit was financed by contributions to
the SIA amounting to 8 percent of taxable salaries; five percent represented the employer’s
contribution and 3 percent the employee’s (Table 1, Panel B). The health insurance benefit,
however, covered only registered employees. Individuals not in the labor force, unregis-
tered employees, workers’ spouses who were not themselves registered employees, and the
dependent children of registered employees had to pay for their own health care, purchase
private health insurance, or use the public healthcare system, which is subject to a means
test.
The most important provision of the reform was the extension of SIA health insurance
benefits to cover the beneficiary’s dependent spouses and children.4 Because of fiscal
3Very low-income workers are also excluded from the health insurance benefit. The threshold is defined
as those earning below 1.25 times the Base de Prestaciones y Contribuciones (BPC). Created in 2004 (Law
17,856), the BPC index replaced the minimum wage as the indexing basis for all government benefits. The
baseline was the value of the minimum wage in force on December 20, 2004. It was UYU 1,636 in 2007, or
about USD 103 per month at the 2010 PPP adjusted exchange rate.
4Borgia (2008) and Bergolo and Cruces (2013) provide more details about the healthcare system reform,
including the benefit expansion discussed here. Cruces and Bergolo (2013) describe the series of recent
reforms to Uruguay’s social insurance system, including health insurance, family allowances and pensions.
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constraints, this extension was implemented in stages. For the period covered in this
paper, the expansion only reached the dependent children of registered employees.5 The
reform was passed in December 2007 and took effect on January 1, 2008. Eligibility for the
health insurance benefit extension required that the registered employee have at least one
dependent child under the age of 18.6 The inclusion of these children under the extended
benefit was universal, irrespective of pre-existing health conditions and previous health
insurance arrangements. As with the previous individual-based benefits, the worker had to
be registered with the SIA (compliant with payroll taxes and social insurance regulations),
and work at least 25 hours per week or earn above a minimum threshold. While the reform
covered all salaried workers, the HIBEX was most relevant for private-sector registered
employees, since a large fraction of public-sector workers were already entitled to health
insurance coverage for their dependents (Ministerio de Salud Pu´blica, 2010b).
HIBEX beneficiaries could choose a health insurance provider in the private sector or
rely on the public healthcare system for their children. Regardless of of the option chosen,
the SIA reimbursed each child’s premium to the corresponding institutions. Registered
employees, however, opted overwhelmingly for the private sector, with only about 5 percent
of all children enrolled in the extended benefit using the public system in 2008 (Banco de
Previsio´n Social, 2009).
The HIBEX represented a large-scale policy change. It had a substantial impact on
the health insurance coverage of its target population and substantially increased privately
provided insurance for children under the age of 18. Figure 1 depicts the trend in the
percentage of dependent children of private-sector employees aged 0-17 (i.e., eligible for
HIBEX) who used private-sector healthcare providers for the period 2004-2010; from 2008
onwards, it depicts the trend in the proportion of those who accessed private-sector health
care through the HIBEX. The figure also plots the same series for individuals aged 18
and older - i.e., those not covered by the benefit extension.7 In the period from 2004 to
2007, the evolution of private healthcare coverage for both groups was similar. Following
the 2008 reform, private healthcare coverage for individuals aged 0-17 increased by 30
percentage points, and it continued to grow (albeit slightly) until 2010. This change was
driven by the HIBEX reform, as indicated by the series depicting the percentage of children
0-17 who accessed private health care through the new program. In contrast, there was
no significant change in the trend in private healthcare coverage for individuals aged 18 or
older. By 2008, 450,000 children under 18 years old were insured through the HIBEX, or
about 48 percent of all children of this age group in Uruguay (Banco de Previsio´n Social,
5The extended benefit also reached children under the age of 18 with retired parents eligible for a SIA
old-age pension after the reform. It covered as well the dependent children of those retired before the
reform but who belonged to the low-income group of the old-age pension system. By 2008, children in this
group represented fewer than 1 percent of all children enrolled (Banco de Previsio´n Social, 2009). This
small number of individuals is excluded from the analysis.
6For the purpose of the SIA benefit, a dependent child is defined as an offspring, a stepchild or a foster
child of the registered employee under the age of 18. Disabled children above this age threshold also qualify
for the HIBEX. The reform also established that dependent children enrolled in the HIBEX could retain
coverage until the age of 21 if their parents reimbursed the value of the child’s insurance premium to the
SIA.
7Computed with microdata from the Encuesta Continua de Hogares, described below. Similar trends
are found in administrative records from the Ministry for Public Health.
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2009) out of a total population of about 3.3 million individuals (Uruguayan National
Bureau of Statistics, projection for 2008).
To finance this extension of coverage, the legislation specified an increase in payroll
contributions for most workers, with a crucial distinction between parents and childless
workers. Employer contributions remained unchanged by the reform at 5 percent of tax-
able earnings as one of the reform’s stated intentions was to leave firms’ employment
costs unaffected. The employee’s contribution to the health insurance benefit, however,
increased from 3 to 6 percent of taxable earnings for registered private-sector workers with
dependent children under the age of 18, regardless of the number of qualifying children.
The reform also increased the contribution for childless registered employees and for those
whose children did not qualify (those over the age of 18) from 3 to 4.5 percent of their
taxable earnings. The payroll tax remained unchanged at the 3 percent level for low-wage
workers, defined as those with monthly earnings below 2.5 times the value of the BPC
(UYU 1,775 per month in 2008, USD 112), irrespective of whether they had children who
qualified for the HIBEX or not. The reform thus increased the overall payroll tax rate
from 30.75 to 32.25 percent for most childless registered workers, and from 30.75 to 33.75
percent for most registered workers with young dependent children, with no change in
contributions for very low-wage workers. Table 1, Panel B, summarizes the changes in the
contributions and the total payroll taxes introduced by the HIBEX reform.
The reform implied a potential net benefit for most adults with eligible children. The
market value of the extended benefit exceeded the increase in the tax liability for most
parents in registered employment. For instance, the monthly health insurance premium
for a child in the private market in 2007 was more than two times the 3 percent increase
in the contribution of the average monthly taxable earnings of a registered private-sector
worker.8 Moreover, the average number of eligible children per adult in the sample in
2007 was 1.92 (Table 1). However, this comparison must be qualified. For high earners
with few children, the cost of the increase in the payroll tax may have ended up being
more than the new benefit, although only a small number of workers at the top of the
income distribution faced this potential net loss.9A further qualification stems from the
fact that childless workers faced an increase in the cost of registered employment (a total
of 1.5 percent of salaried earnings) without any additional benefit. This may have yielded
a reduction in the level of employment for this group of workers. However, the available
empirical evidence for Latin America indicates that even sweeping changes in labor taxes
had negligible effects on employment (Gruber, 1997; Cruces, Galiani and Kidyba, 2010).
An increase of 1.5 percentage points in the social insurance contributions of childless
registered workers can, then, be expected to have had a negligible effect. In any case,
8The average monthly taxable earnings for a private-sector registered employee in 2007 was UYU 12,305
(USD 778 per month at the 2010 PPP adjusted exchange rate), and thus the 3 percentage point increase
in the contribution rate represented UYU 369 (USD 23). In contrast, the health insurance premium for
a child in the private market in 2007 was on average UYU 859 (USD 54) per month (Ministerio de Salud
Pu´blica, 2010a).
9In 2007, the reform implied a net loss in income only for those registered workers with one child and
taxable earnings above UYU 28,633, and for those with two children and earnings above UYU 57,267.
These values correspond to the 94th and 99th percentiles of the distribution of monthly labor earnings for
registered workers in 2007.
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after the reform, only about 8 percent of children benefiting from the HIBEX used the
public healthcare sector rather than private health insurance providers (Figure 1). The
very high take up of the HIBEX suggests that it represented a net benefit for a majority
of those eligible. Thus, the empirical analysis in this paper is based on a comparison of
labor market outcomes for adults with and without eligible children. Section 4.2 below
addresses some of the caveats with this comparison, the identification strategy and some
robustness tests to validate it.
3 Work and tax evasion incentives effects of the health in-
surance benefit extension
The health insurance benefit extension represents an increase in the benefits associated
with registered employment for individuals who work 25 hours or more per week (the
minimum hour cut-off for eligibility) and have children under the age of 18. This policy
change yields a number of predictions on labor supply and tax evasion responses.10 Given
these new incentives, the main expected effect of the reform would be an increase in the
probability of moving into benefit-eligible employment (i.e., working 25 hours or more
per week in registered employment) for parents of children in the 0-17 age range. There
are three possible channels through which this change could operate. First, the reform
introduced an incentive to work in registered employment with 25 or more hours per week
for those not working. Second, those in unregistered employment faced a similar incen-
tive: either to move into a benefit-eligible job or to formalize their existing employment
arrangement (i.e., getting “on”-the-books with 25 declared hours at their current job).
Third, the reform provided an incentive for those in registered employment working less
than 25 hours per week to increase their declared hours of work to at least 25.
The main expected effect yields the prediction that (1) the number of individuals with
children in registered employment working 25 hours or more per week should increase after
the reform. The different channels through which this main effect operates imply some of
the following additional predictions: (2) the number of those not working should decrease,
(3) the number of individuals with unregistered employment should fall, (4) the number of
individuals in registered employment (irrespective of hours worked) should increase, and
more specifically (5) conditioned on registered employment, the number of those working
25 hours or more per week should increase.11
While the discussion has thus far referred to overall effects, the benefits derived from
the reform (and thus the behavioral reactions to the new incentives) may have varied
in magnitude for different subgroups defined by the demographic characteristics of an
individual’s household. First, since the increase in the payroll tax was independent of the
number of children, the reform implied a larger financial incentive for individuals with
10The structure of the discussion in this section was suggested by an anonymous referee.
11These are all quantitatively relevant margins of adjustment. In 2007, before the reform, about 54
percent of individuals with children in the sample were not eligible for the extended benefit. Those not
working represented 33 percent of all individuals with children, 16 percent were unregistered employees,
and about 5 percent were registered employees working below the 25 weeklyhour threshold (see Table 1,
Panel A).
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more children and for those with younger children (since the benefit covers children up to
the age of 18, implying a longer potential duration of the benefit).
Second, the rules of the benefit extension imply that the HIBEX may have induced a
differential response for single parents compared to parents living with their partners for
at least two reasons.12 On the one hand, the rules of the reform implied a potential double
taxation for couples, since if the two parents were registered employees, both had to pay
the increase in the payroll tax (if both worked more than 25 hours a week) for the same
level of benefit. Thus, individuals with partners in benefit-eligible employment did not face
an additional incentive to move to benefit-eligible employment themselves after the reform,
since the couple’s children would be covered through their partners (in fact, they faced
an incentive to reduce participation in benefit-eligible employment). In turn, individuals
whose partners were not in benefit-eligible employment faced an additional incentive to
take up (or remain in) benefit-eligible employment themselves to warrant coverage for the
couple’s children. On the other hand, the HIBEX represented an unambiguous incentive
for single parents, in contrast to married individuals, to take up benefit-eligible employ-
ment, since they would not face any double taxation or have to take another individual’s
labor market outcomes into account when making their own decisions.
Finally, changes in tax rates can also affect the incentives for reporting earnings to
the tax authorities. Given the increased costs associated with registered employment in
the form of higher payroll taxes, the reform may also have affected the intensive margin
of tax evasion by inducing more underreporting of salaried earnings. This additional
incentive may affect both the firm (which faces higher payroll tax liabilities) and the
worker (who faces lower after-tax wages). It may result in higher rates of underreporting
on the part of the firm or pursuant to collusion of employers and employees. In any
case, the literature reviewed above indicates that underreporting is more likely at small
firms. An additional prediction on the effects of the reform is thus that (6) the number of
registered employees with eligible children stating that their earnings were underreported
should increase, especially among those working at small firms.
4 Data and empirical strategy
4.1 Sample and outcomes of interest
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on cross-sectional microdata from the En-
cuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) survey carried out by Uruguay’s National Institute of
Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica, INE) since 1990. The ECH is a nationally
representative household survey conducted according to international standards. It com-
bines elements of living standards and labor force surveys, and it is the main source for
socioeconomic, labor and demographic indicators in Uruguay. The microdata and support-
ing documents, such as questionnaires and details on sample selection and stratification,
are all publicly available.
12The benefit extension covered the children of legally married and cohabiting couples. The text some-
times refers to individuals in both types of arrangements as married for the sake of brevity.
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The analysis in this paper relies on two waves of the survey corresponding to the first
and second semester of the calendar year. These repeated cross-sections cover the period
from the 2nd semester of 2004 to the 2nd semester of 2010, that is, three and a half years
before the reform and three years after it. The sample for the analysis includes men and
women aged 25 through 55 who are either heads of households or ’ spouses of heads of
households. The sample excludes individuals who reside in rural areas or in urban areas
with less than 5000 inhabitants, since the ECH only extended its coverage to such areas
in 2006.13 The analysis is carried out on a sample of private-sector salaried employees
(excluding the self-employed), as well as the unemployed and individuals outside the labor
force in the relevant age range. The sample does not include government employees because
a large proportion were entitled to health insurance for their dependents before the reform.
The sample also excludes retired and disabled individuals and those who were studying
full time during the survey’s referenceperiod. Taking all of these restrictions into account
and pooling all the survey waves yields a sample of 97,552 individuals for the 2004-2010
period.
The ECH collects information on all the relevant outcomes discussed in the previous
section: employment and labor force participation, hours of work, the SIA registration
status of the employee, salaried earnings and whether there is underreporting of such
earnings. The registration status of an employee is derived from a specific self-reported
variable that indicates whether contributions (payroll taxes) are paid to the SIA for her
current job.14 The ECH questionnaire also contains a unique feature for detecting the pres-
ence of underreporting of earnings for registered salaried workers. Since 2006, registered
private-sector employees have been asked directly whether their salaried earnings are being
underreported to the tax and social security authorities. The specific question is: “Are
your contributions based on the total amount of your earnings from this job?” (“¿Aporta
por la totalidad del salario en esa ocupacio´n?”). The explicit aim of the question is to
establish if tax evasion is taking place, as stated in the ECH enumerator’s manual which
specifies that this question attempts to “capture underreporting of salaried earnings for
the computation of social security contributions”.15 Finally, all of the estimates presented
below are computed using the corresponding ECH sampling weights.16
13While this implies a loss of information, there is a trade-off between a more representative sample and
a longer pre-reform period with a comparable sample. The latter option was chosen since more than 80
percent of the population of Uruguay resides in urban areas with more than 5000 inhabitants.
14The specific question in the ECH is: “Are you contributing to a retirement benefit through this job?”
(“¿Aporta a una caja de jubilaciones por este trabajo?”). This is a standardized question in household
surveys in Latin America; it is used to define registered or formal work in most of the recent literature for
the region - see, for instance, Gasparini and Tornarolli (2009) and Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012).
15This question refers specifically to underreporting, and it does not reflect a cap on contributions, which
are voluntary for earnings above a relatively high threshold (monthly earnings above UYU 74,000, about
USD 3,800). This is confirmed by the fact that individuals self-report as underreporting earnings along
the whole income distribution. For instance, for the sample before the reform, 15.1 percent of individuals
in the bottom quintile of the distribution of monthly income declared underreporting of salaried earnings,
with 11.6, 10.9, 9.9 and 6.0 percent in the following quintiles.
16The main results do not vary when the regressions are estimated without the ECH sampling weights.
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4.2 Identification assumptions, econometric strategy and outcomes of
interest
The empirical work in this paper attempts to identify the causal effect of the introduction of
the 2008 health reform on labor market outcomes and tax evasion and to provide evidence
on the direction and magnitude of the incentive effects discussed in the previous section.
The strategy used to evaluate the policy’s effects is a difference-in-differences analysis
(Angrist and Krueger, 1999). This framework compares the evolution of the outcomes of
interest for a group of individuals exposed to a policy change (the treatment group) to
the change in the same outcomes for individuals unaffected by the reform (the comparison
group). The latter group is assumed to capture the counterfactual trend for the treatment
group which would have been observed in the absence of the policy change.
The treatment group consists of individuals aged 25 to 55 with at least one dependent
child under the age of 18, - that is, those potentially eligible for the HIBEX. The compar-
ison group consists of childless individuals in the same age range who were not directly
affected by the benefit extension.17 The empirical analysis therefore compares adults with
at least one dependent child under the age of 18 to individuals in the same age group with
no dependent children. The following is the basic difference-in-difference specification with
controls on which most of the estimates in this paper are based:
Y ijt = α+ δAnyChildrenijt +βAnyChildrenijt ∗PostReformt +X ′ijtγ+ θt +ϕj + τjt + ijt (1)
where i indexes individuals, j state and t time. The variable Y ijt is one of the
outcomes of interest (described in more detail below); AnyChildrenijt is an indicator
variable for individuals in the treatment group, coded as one if the individual has at
least one child under the age of 18 and zero otherwise; PostReformt is a dummy equal
to one in the post-policy period (from January 2008 onwards) and zero otherwise; and
AnyChildrenijt ∗ PostReformt is the interaction term between the two variables, which
captures the difference-in-difference treatment effect. The Xit matrix contains individual-
specific variables to condition the differences in trends to observable characteristics. The
individual controls are age (in 6 categories), gender, head of the household indicator, mar-
ital status, education level (in 6 categories), the number children in the household, the
number of children under the age of 6, and the number of children and age and educa-
tion interactions (both in 6 categories). The estimations also include controls for firm
size and industry (5 and 9 categories, respectively) for the outcomes which are defined
for the labor force. θt and ϕj are a full set of semester and state fixed effects (Uruguay
is administratively divided into nineteen states or “departamentos”), which account for
aggregate systematic shocks to local labor markets correlated with, but not caused by, the
17The empirical analysis below also relies on an alternative comparison between individuals with and
without children within the group of low-earning registered employees (those earning below 2.5 BPC).
These individuals benefited from the extended coverage if they had children, but did not face the increase
in SIA contributions (from 3 to 6 percent for those with children and from 3 to 4.5 percent for the childless).
While this constitutes a potentially viable comparison group, the resulting sample size is small and the
results are underpowered. These results are presented as part of the robustness tests in Table 7 below.
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HIBEX. Finally, τ jt are state-by-semester effects, introduced to control for state-specific
shocks over the period that might be independent of national economic conditions.
The analysis is based on six outcomes of interest directly related to the expected ef-
fects discussed in Section 3. The first is benefit-eligible employment, which is an indicator
coded as one for salaried employees who report 25 hours or more per week at a regis-
tered job and zero otherwise. This minimum hour cut-off is determined by the eligibility
requirement for health insurance coverage. The second outcome of interest is registered
employment, which is an indicator variable coded as one for registered salaried employees
and zero otherwise (irrespective of the number of hours worked). The third outcome is
unregistered employment, an indicator coded as one for off-the-book salaried employees
and zero otherwise. The fourth variable of interest is benefit-eligible employment defined
only for registered employees, which is coded as one for registered employment at or above
25 hours per week and zero for those in registered employment working 24 hours or less.
A fifth outcome of interest is an indicator variable equal to one for those not working and
zero for those working (either as registered or unregistered employees). These variables are
defined for all individuals in the sample for the whole 2004-2010 period, with the exception
of conditional benefit-eligible employment which is defined only for the subsample of regis-
tered employees (56,707 observations). Finally, a sixth outcome of interest, underreporting
of salaried earnings, is captured by a measure coded as one if the individual reports her
salaried earnings as underreported to the SIA and zero otherwise. The analysis is based
on the subsample of registered employees for the years 2006-2010 (50,669 observations).
The estimations rely on linear probability models (OLS) for the binary dependent
variables and all the regression results report Huber-White robust standard errors. The
main results are based on the 2004-2010 period excluding both semesters of 2008, since
the policy change was effectively implemented throughout that year.18
The difference-in-differences identification strategy in this setting requires two main
assumptions. First, in the absence of the reform, the underlying trends in labor mar-
ket outcomes (conditional on observable characteristics X) would have been similar for
the treatment and comparison groups. This assumption would be violated if there were
unobservable shocks that affected the trends in the outcomes of interest for both groups
differently – shocks correlated with the policy change and with the group-specific trends
in outcomes. Section 5 discusses the results from an extended version of the model of
Equation 1 which includes controls for time trends interacted with the treatment group
indicator. Section 6 also presents some additional specification checks to explore this possi-
bility. An additional concern would arise if, besides the health insurance benefit extension,
some other contemporaneous changes affected individuals with and without children. The
introduction of HIBEX was accompanied and preceded by the implementation of a series
of new programs and reforms in other existing schemes as part of an active government
policy to expand the safety net in Uruguay,19 but the main results of this paper are not
18The main results are qualitatively similar when observations for 2008 are included (Table 3).
19For a detailed description of those programs and reforms, see Cruces and Bergolo (2013), Amarante
et al. (2011) and Manacorda et al. (2011).
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affected by the introduction of controls for participation in other programs.20
The second identification assumption is that the composition of each group remained
constant over the period under study.21 This assumption may be incorrect, for instance,
if the treatment group expands over time and incorporates individuals with different char-
acteristics. Although Equation 1 includes controls for a broad set of individual char-
acteristics, this may not be enough to control for potential differences in group-specific
compositional changes over time. Section 6 discusses in more detail these concerns and
presents some sensitivity checks to test the validity of the identification strategy.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Descriptive analysis
Table 1 presents summary statistics by treatment status before and after the policy change
(from the second semester of 2004 to the second semester of 2007 and from the first
semester of 2009 to the second semester of 2010, respectively) for individuals in the sample
with and without eligible children. The statistics in Panel A indicate that individuals
in the two groups were reasonably similar in terms of age, education and other main
socioeconomic characteristics. Most importantly, the last column in the table presents
the difference between the pre- and post-reform changes for the two groups (effectively,
an unconditional difference-in-differences analysis), which indicates only a few statistically
significant changes in the average characteristics of the two groups. This evidence suggests
that, at least in terms of observed characteristics, the main results discussed below are
not driven by compositional effects.
The bottom rows of Panel A in Table 1 present similar descriptive statistics for the
main labor market outcomes defined in Section 4.2. The average level of benefit-eligible
employment before and after the reform was about 58 and 67 percent respectively for the
comparison group and about 46 and 57 percent respectively for the treatment group. These
differences in levels between the two groups are also reflected by the level of the not-working
indicator, ranging from 21 to 16 percent for the comparison group and from 33 to 25 percent
for the treatment group. On the contrary, the levels of benefit-eligible employment and
of underreporting of earnings (both conditional on registered employment) were similar
between the two groups for the two periods: about 91-92 percent of registered workers
were eligible for the HIBEX and about 10 percent stated that their earnings were being
underreported.
Figure 2, in turn, illustrates the essnce of the basic results for the outcomes of interest
presented in Table 1. The Figure plots the conditional difference (with basic demographic
controls) in the annual predicted benefit-eligible employment rates between 2004 and 2010
20A subsample of those in the treatment group (low-income individuals with children) participated in a
means tested transfer program for families with at least one dependent child (“asignaciones familiares’’).
As a disincentive to work, this would result in an attenuation bias for the estimates of the effects of the
HIBEX. Specification checks (available upon request) indicate that this benefit did not affect the main
HIBEX estimates.
21Abadie (2005) and Athey and Imbens (2006) discuss the implications of compositional changes in the
difference-in-differences framework.
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for the comparison group (childless adults) and for a subset of the treatment group, single
parents with children under 18 years.22 Following the severe economic crisis that affected
Uruguay in 2003-2004, the level of benefit-eligible employment increased substantially over
the whole sample period for all groups. The difference in this rate between childless adults
and single parents was relatively small (about 1.4 percentage points on average) and stable
for the pre-reform period 2004-2007. After the reform, benefit-eligible employment grew
markedly faster for single parents, which is reflected in the upward trend in the series
and in the substantially larger average difference of 7.9 percentage point for 2008-2010.
This simple evidence is further reinforced by the unconditional difference-in-differences
estimates of the reform’s effect presented in Panel A of Table 1 for the overall treatment
group, which indicate an increase in benefit-eligible registered employment of about 1.6
percentage points, as well as a fall in the proportion of those not working of about 2
percentage points, with no significant differences for underreporting of earnings or for
the conditional benefit-eligible variable. This preliminary evidence on the impact of the
HIBEX is further developed below in terms of the full conditional difference-in-differences
framework given by Equation 1.
5.2 Baseline results: Labor supply and registered employment
Table 2 presents the baseline estimates of the effects of the 2008 health insurance benefit
extension on the labor market outcomes of interest discussed in Section 3. Each column
reports the OLS estimates of Equation 1 for the main outcomes: benefit-eligible em-
ployment, not working, registered and unregistered employment, and benefit-employment
conditional on registered work. The first row in Table 2 presents the estimates and stan-
dard errors of the interaction coefficient β in Equation 1, which captures the impact of the
HIBEX. The second row displays the estimates of the coefficient of the treatment variable
(AnyChildren in Equation 1). The last row in Table 2 reports the average of each column’s
dependent variable for the period before the implementation of the HIBEX (2004-2007).
The discussion focuses on the specifications with the full set of controls in Equation 1;
the estimates with no controls are similar in size but less precisely estimated (see Table 1,
Panel A).
The estimates in column 1 of Table 2 correspond to the main outcome of interest,
that is, benefit-eligible employment. The result indicates a statically significant increase
in registered employment above the 25 weekly-hour cut-off for parents of young children
relative to childless individuals of 1.62 percentage points. In terms of the pre-intervention
average, this effect represents an increase of 3.5 percent. While small, this effect is still
economically significant when compared to the trend in this variable over the period under
study.
Columns 2 to 5 present the results from the additional predictions corresponding to
the alternative channels of response outlined in Section 3. The negative and significant
22The underlying specification for Figure 2 is analogous to that of Table 5, with a limited set of de-
mographic controls and yearly treatment dummies. The sample is the same as in Table 5, panel A. This
subgroup is better suited for a visual presentation of the main results because, as described below, the
effects of the policy for single parents are substantially larger than for the overall treatment group.
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coefficient of -1.62 for the not working indicator in column 2 indicates that the HIBEX
induced unemployed individuals and/or those previously out of the labor force to join the
labor market (a 4.9 percent increase relative to the pre-reform average). The reform could
also have increased benefit-eligible employment through the formalization of unregistered
employees. The positive and significant coefficient of 1.52 for registered employment in
column 3 (very close to those in columns 1 and 2) and the virtually null and insignificant
coefficient for the effect of the HIBEX on unregistered employment (column 4) indicate
that the increase in benefit-eligible employment was mainly channeled through an increase
in registered employment for those not previously working, rather than an increase in the
registration of those previously in unregistered employment. The results indicate that the
HIBEX did not produce, on average, a decline in unregistered employment. The distinction
between single and married individuals below, however, indicates some additional effects
for those facing greater changes in incentives after the reform.
Finally, the results in column 5 indicate that part of the overall effect on benefit-eligible
employment was due to an increase in the hours of work above the 25 weekly-hour cut-off
point for those who were registered employees.23 This is consistent with the discussion in
Section 3, since working right below the eligibility threshold becomes even less beneficial.
While statistically significant at the 5 percent level, the 1.1 percentage points effect of the
HIBEX for this variable is relatively small: it only implies a 1.2 percent increase relative
to the pre-reform average, since about 90 percent of registered workers were above the
cut-off before the policy change.
The discussion in Section 3 also implies a series of predictions about empirical re-
sults that would be incompatible with the postulated incentive effects of the HIBEX. For
instance, there should be no positive effect of the reform on registered work below the
hour-eligibility threshold. This placebo test can be implemented by defining the outcome
as an indicator equal to one for those registered employees working less than 25 hours
per week and zero for all other individuals. A regression similar to those in Table 2
yields a coefficient for the effect of the reform on this outcome of -0.001, with a stan-
dard error of 0.0037. Moreover, a further placebo test implies that the HIBEX should
not have an impact on unregistered hours of work above or below 25 weekly hours - a
significant difference-in-differences in this variable between the comparison and treatment
groups would indicate some underlying group-specific trend and would cast doubt on the
identification strategy. Conditioning the previous estimate on unregistered workers, the
coefficient of the reform variable is -0.0097 and statistically insignificant at standard levels
(standard error of 0.0204).
The estimates presented in Table 2 would be biased if the treatment and comparison
groups had different underlying trends in labor market outcomes. Inspection of Figure 2
did not reveal major differences in the pre-reform trends for the benefit-eligible employ-
23A detailed analysis of hours of work for different groups indicates a substantial shift among working
parents from 24 weekly hours or less to more than 25 weekly hours. Since only about 10 percent of
registered workers with eligible children worked less than 25 hours and about 7 percent worked 25 to 34
hours during the pre-reform period, the sample size is too small to conduct an analysis of bunching around
this threshold.
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ment variable, but this can be tested formally by means of a flexible version of the basic
difference-in-differences model. Table 3 presents the results from estimating Equation 1
for the full 2004-2010 period. The Table reports the coefficients of the year dummies
interacted with the eligible children indicators.24 The omitted period is 2008 (the year of
the policy implementation), so all coefficients are measured relative to that year. Each
row of the table reports the coefficients for the year-eligibility interaction for each of the
dependent variables, which include the five outcomes in Table 2.
The results in Table 3 confirm the robustness of the results in Table 2 and reinforce
the soundness of the identification strategy. First, only one of the 20 pre-reform year coef-
ficients for the 5 regressions is statistically significant at the standard levels (unregistered
employment in 2004), which confirms the lack of differential trends between the treatment
and comparison groups in the pre-reform period. Second, the coefficient for benefit-eligible
employment is large (2.49-2.6 percentage points) and statistically significant for the two
years after the implementation of the policy, while that of registered employment is also
relatively large (1.7-1.99 percentage points), but only significant at standard levels for 2009
(although the size of the coefficient is similar for 2010 with a p-value of about 15 percent,
which suggests lack of statistical power rather than lack of effect). Third, the effect on the
not-working indicator and the benefit-eligible employment conditional on registered work
are only statistically significant for 2010. The lack of evidence of pre-existing differential
trends and the lack of effects on the placebo outcomes support the causal interpretation
of the main results in Table 2. Section 6 presents additional evidence on their robustness.
Taken together, the pattern of results in Table 2 indicates that eligible individuals
responded to the health insurance benefit extension as predicted in Section 3. The bulk
of the response to the additional benefit appears to have occurred due to an increase in
participation rather than due to changes in hours of registered workers or shifts from off-
-the-book to on-the-book employment. The following section breaks the results down by
subgroups facing differential incentives.
5.3 Differential incentives: Estimates by age and number of children
As discussed in Sections 2.3 and 3, the reform’s financial incentives varied as a function of
the age and number of an individual’s dependent children. The higher cost associated with
the extended benefit represented a fixed percentage of taxable earnings irrespective of the
number of children who gained access to health insurance (the SIA covered the premiums
of all dependent children), and thus implied a larger financial incentive for employees with
more children. Moreover, younger children are associated with higher insurance and out-
of-pocket health expenditures and with a longer duration of the benefit. Younger children
should increase the implicit value of the HIBEX for their parents.
To explore the potential heterogeneity introduced by these varying financial incentives,
the basic model in Equation 1 is extended to allow for different treatment effects according
24The year dummies are also included independently, as described in Equation 1. The estimates in
Table 3, and other tables, are based on annual rather than semester dummies because the latter are too
imprecisely estimated.
19
to the number of dependent children and the age range of those children. The resulting
specification is:










ijt ∗ PostReformt +
X ′ijtγ + θt + ϕj + τjt + ijt (2)
where AnyChildren(k)ijt is an indicator equal to one if individual i in state j at time t has
children in group k, where k represents one of the following four mutually exclusive groups:
one child aged 0-10; one child aged 11-17; two or more children where the youngest is aged
0-10; two or more children where the youngest is aged 11-18. The matrix Xijt includes
the same covariates as Equation 1, and the additional terms represent the same set of
state and time controls. The results from regressions based on Equation 2 are presented
in Table 4. The rows in this table report the estimates of the HIBEX’s impact for each
number of children/age range group, β(k).
Column 1 in Table 4 indicates an increase of about 2.5 percentage points in benefit-
eligible employment for parents with one child aged 0-10, and of 1.8 percentage points
for parents with two or more children where the youngest is aged 0-10. The coefficients
for the indicators of one child and two children aged 11-17, however, are not significantly
different from zero. In keeping with the literature, the greater effects in the case of parents
of young children are in line with the evidence on larger employment responses to financial
incentives for this group, particularly among single women (see Eissa and Liebman, 1996,
and Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001, for the EITC, and Francesconi and van der Klaauw,
2007, for the WTFC).
The pattern of results for the other labor market outcomes in Table 4 is similar: the
effects are mainly driven by the indicators for having at least one child in the 0-10 age
group (for registered employment, for instance), while the negative effect on the not-
working indicator is mainly driven by the dummies corresponding to those with more
than one child (irrespective of the age of the youngest child). Together, these results
confirm the prediction of a larger reaction to the HIBEX among those with more children
and among those with a longer horizon of benefits for their children, as suggested in the
discussion in Section 3.
5.4 Differential incentives: Estimates by marital status
The HIBEX also introduced differential incentives for different household configurations.
The incentives were stronger for single parents since, by definition, the coverage of their
dependent children did not depend on the employment status of a partner and since they
did not face any potential double taxation. The incentives faced by married partners, in
turn, varied according to their partner’s employment and benefit-eligibility status.
The results in Table 5 broadly confirm these expected differential reactions to the
reform. Panel A presents the results for the same five labor market outcomes in previous
tables conditioning the sample on single parents (about 17,000 individuals from a total of
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more than 97,000 in the whole sample). The pattern of results is similar to the baseline
estimates of Table 2, but with much larger and more significant effects, even with a
substantially smaller number of observations. With respect to single childless individuals,
single parents increased their level of benefit-eligible employment by 5.3 percentage points
(significant at the one percent level), which represents a 14 percent increase with respect to
the pre-reform average. This effect is about four times greater than the effect reported for
the entire sample as shown in Table 2. The impact of the reform reduced the proportion
of the not-working indicator by about 2.1 percentage points (column 2, significant at
the 10 percent level) and, as such, it was similar to the effect for the entire sample.
However, the estimated impact on unregistered employment (column 3) for single parents
is negative and highly significant statistically, indicating a decline of about 4 percentage
points in this labor market outcome indicator with respect to the comparison group.
The impact of the reform on this indicator for the entire sample was virtually zero. The
reductions in the number of single parents not working and of those working in unregistered
employment are reflected in the sizeable (6.2 percent) increase in the number of those in
registered employment (column 4, significant at the one percent level). The small and not
satistically significant coefficient in column 5 (benefit-eligible employment conditional on
being a registered employee) indicates that the increase in the number of single parents in
benefit-eligible employment (column 1) was mainly attributable to those switching from
unregistered to registered employment, with a smaller contribution from those entering
the labor force and no discernible impact from registered employees increasing their hours
to meet the benefit cut-off. Together, the results suggest that the positive response in the
level of benefit-eligible employment for single parents after the policy change was driven by
transitions from unregistered to on-the-book employment for those who were working with
a smaller contribution from those entering the labor force. The smaller baseline effects for
the entire sample, on the other hand, corresponded mostly to the latter factor.
Panel B in Table 5 presents estimates of the same models for the sample of married
and cohabiting individuals. The estimates are substantially smaller than those for singles
and in line, albeit less signifcant, than those for the entire sample (Table 2). Only the
coefficient of the variable in column 5 (benefit-eligible employment conditional on being a
registered employee) is statistically different from zero (and only at the 10 percent level).
However, further testing indicates that this effect cannot be distinguished from the effect
of the reform on the same variable for singles (p-value of 0.49).
The fact that the HIBEX had no impact on the sample of married parents, however,
does not mean that there were no responses at the household level. Since the extended
health coverage of a couple’s children only required one of the parents to hold benefit-
eligible employment, an individual’s response should depend on the employment status
of her partner. These household-level responses can be tested by means of an extended
version of the model given by Equation 1 which includes additional indicators on whether
or not the fact that an individual’s partner holds a benefit-eligible job interacted with the
variable capturing the HIBEX’s effect (AnyChildren*PostReform). It should be stressed
that the identification of these effects arises from the assumption that the eligibility status
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of the spouse is exogenously given.
The estimates of these coefficients presented in Panel C in Table 5 distinguish between
the two cases, labeled “Eligible partners” and “Ineligible partners.” Two sets of results
emerge from the estimates presented in this panel. For individuals whose partners were
not in benefit-eligible employment, the HIBEX induces a statistically significant increase in
this type of employment of about 1.7 percentage points (significant at the 10 percent level).
This change seems to be driven mostly by an increase in registered employment, although
this coefficient is not significant (column 4, coefficient 1.2). To a lesser extent, the overall
change is also due to a small increase (with respect to the 0.92 pre-reform level) in benefit-
eligible employment for those in registered employment (column 5). On the other hand,
and as expected, the HIBEX had virtually zero effect on the benefit-eligible employment
(column 1) in the case of individuals whose partners received access to the extended
benefit through employment. These individuals did not have the additional incentive
of gaining access to the extended benefit. In fact, the reform seems to have induced a
statistically significant increase in unregistered employment for this group of about 1.8
percentage points (column 4, significant at the five percent level). However, the source of
this effect seems to have been a reduction in the number of those not working (column 2,
coefficient of -1.5 percentage points, significant at the 10 percent level) rather than through
a transition from registered to unregistered employment (column 4, coefficient of 0.27
percentage points, not statistically significant), which would have been more consistent
with the mechanisms highlighted in Section 3.
To sum up, the response patterns for married and cohabiting individuals are in line
with the predicted effects of the reform. They are also consistent with the existing evidence
on the labor supply responses to financial incentives for households (Eissa and Hoynes,
2004), and they extend this evidence to an additional margin of choice between registered
and unregistered employment. These results also confirm the relevance of social insurance
benefits to the observed patterns of informal employment for heads of households and
their partners in Latin American countries (Galiani and Weinschelbaum, 2012).
5.5 Underreporting of salaried earnings
The results indicate that workers reacted to the reform along the registered-unregistered
employment margin, with more individuals working at jobs complying with payroll taxes
and contributions after the reform. This can be interpreted as an extensive margin of tax
evasion - i.e., a decision of the employer and/or the employee about whether or not to evade
the full amount of employment-related taxes. As the discussion in Section 3 highlights,
however, changes in taxes and benefits could also have an impact on the intensive margin
of evasion of employment-related taxes. Employers and/or employees might decide to pay
taxes for less than the full amount due, and this type of evasion would take the form of
underreporting of earnings.
The HIBEX could affect this form of non-compliance with the tax authorities and
the social insurance administration in several ways. The previous results indicate that a
significant number of individuals moved to benefit-eligible registered employment following
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the reform. To access the extended health insurance coverage for their children, these
workers and their employers had to incur the full cost of payroll taxes and contributions,
which amounted to more than 30 percent of taxable earnings, since the additional benefit
could not be granted independently of other social insurance benefits. Moreover, for
those who already held benefit-eligible registered employment, the higher contribution
rate implied an incentive to increase underreporting to avoid a reduction in net earnings
for workers and to avoid higher total payroll tax payments for employers.
Either as the result of collusion between employers and employees or pursuant to em-
ployers’ unilateral decisions to evade taxes, the reform may have increased underreporting
of salaried earnings for registered employment. As discussed in Section 4.1, the analysis of
this margin of adjustment to the reform relies on workers’ responses to a specific question
in the survey, one that enquires about whether the contributions to the SIA for earnings
from a registered job were based on the full amount of taxable earnings. Table 6, column 1,
presents the difference-in-differences estimates of the HIBEX’s impact on underreporting
of salaried earnings to the SIA for the subsample of registered employees. As expected,
the sign of the coefficient is positive, but it is not significantly different from zero. How-
ever, as discussed in Section 3, there may be heterogeneous effects on underreporting as
a function of firm size. As highlighted in recent studies, tax evasion by employers and
employees is more difficult for large firms to sustain, whereas it is easier for small firms
to misrepresent salaried earnings (Kleven, Kreiner and Saez, 2009). The average level of
underreporting of 10 percent in Table 1 varies significantly in the sample under study:
in 2007, 18.5 percent of workers at firms with less than 10 employees declared that their
earnings were underreported, but this figure is only 11.2 percent for those employed at
firms with 10 to 49 workers and only 4.1 percent at firms with more than 50 employees.25
These potential heterogeneous effects are addressed by re-estimating the same regression,
but conditioning it on firm size. These results are presented in columns 2 to 4 in Table 6.
Consistent with the previous discussion, the HIBEX has a positive and significant effect
on underreporting only for employees at firms with less than 10 workers. With respect
to those in the comparison group, the reform implied a 3.4 percentage point increase in
underreporting of salaried earnings after the reform, which represents a sizeable increase
(about 19 percent) in the rate of underreporting. On the other hand, the estimated effects
of the reform on workers at firms with 10 to 49 workers (column 3) and on workers at
firms with over 50 employees (column 4) are substantially smaller in absolute terms (-0.52
and -0.31 percentage points, respectively); in neither case are they significantly different
from zero.
Finally, the reform should only increase underreporting in benefit-eligible registered
employment and not in ineligible-registered employment (for those working less than the 25
weekly-hour cut-off). As an additional robustness test of these results, and to rule out the
impact of other contemporaneous changes, Panels B and C in Table 6 re-estimate the same
25Evasion by means of unregistered employment follows a similar pattern. In 2007, the pre-reform year,
41.1 percent of employees at firms with less than 10 workers were not registered with the SIA, whereas
only 9.5 percent of employees at medium-sized firms (10 to 49 employees) were not registered, and only
3.3 percent at firms with more than 50 workers.
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models for all workers and by firm size, but restrict the sample to those in benefit-eligible
registered employment (Panel B) and to those in benefit-ineligible registered employment
(Panel C) - i.e., distinguishing between those working more and less than 25 hours per
week. The only significant coefficient in the two panels is that of the effect of the reform
on workers in benefit-eligible employment at small firms. In that case, the coefficient (4.1
percentage points, about 25 percent more than the pre-reform level) is similar in size to
the one reported in Panel A, whereas the additional placebo test in Panel C indicates
that the reform had no discernible effect (coefficient of 0.5 percentage points) on benefit-
ineligible workers at small firms. The patterns of significance of the coefficients reported
in these two panels confirm the previous findings: the HIBEX’s impact on underreporting
was confined to workers at small firms.
In sum, these results are consistent with recent empirical literature that finds evidence
that changes in tax and benefit systems affect the (unilateral or collusive) decisions of
firms and employees to misreport social insurance contributions and payroll taxes (Tonin,
2011; Kumler, Verhoogen and Frias, 2012). They are also in line with the prediction that
this behavior is feasible at small firms but less likely on larger scales (Chetty, Friedman
and Saez, 2013; Kumler, Verhoogen and Frias, 2012).
6 Robustness and specification tests
The following pages present a series of robustness and specification tests on the difference-
in-differences estimates presented in the previous section. These exercises are based on
variations in the model of Equation 1, with full controls for individual characteristics,
semester and state-fixed effects, and state-by-semester interactions effects, as in the pre-
vious analysis.
The interpretation of the difference-in-differences estimates of the HIBEX’s impact as
a causal effect relies on a series of assumptions. The main identifying assumption is that
the changes in outcomes would have been similar for the treatment and comparison group
in the absence of the reform. While these counterfactuals are inherently non-testable, it is
possible to evaluate auxiliary hypotheses consistent with the identifying assumption. One
option is to consider the pre-reform period and to establish whether there were common
trends in the outcomes of interest, such that the reform represented a departure from the
previous parallel changes.26 The estimates on the year-by-year and treatment interaction
terms presented in Table 3 provide a first test of the empirical strategy and establish
that the difference-in-differences estimates were not simply capturing long-run differential
trends between individuals with and without children.
A further concern for the identification strategy is that the treatment and comparison
groups may have changed over the period under study, confounding treatment with com-
position effects. The summary statistics and the unconditional difference-in-differences
estimates in Table 1 indicate that the main demographic characteristics of both groups
26For instance, Uruguay’s economy grew steadily during the period under study. Individuals with and
without children might respond differently (even conditional on their observable characteristics) to episodes
of growth.
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did not change substantially before and after the policy change, but these cross-sectional
differences in means might still conceal distributional variation across groups. For in-
stance, since the age distribution of individuals with and without eligible children differs,
the trends in their labor supply may have differed by cohort. Panel A in Table 7 presents
the results of a specification that adds a full set of birth-cohort/semester interactions based
on 8-year cohorts. The estimated coefficients for the main outcomes are somewhat smaller
than the baseline results in Table 2, but they remain significant at the usual confidence
levels, with the exception of the benefit-eligible employment conditional on registered em-
ployment outcome in column 5. The regressions were also estimated including interaction
terms between the AnyChildren indicator and the full set of demographic covariates in
order to allow control variables to enter separately for the treatment and the compari-
son groups. Results in Panel B indicate that the main estimates are also robust to this
alternative. Another specification tests includes interactions of all demographic controls
with the post-reform indicator to explore if other covariates could explain the responses
in labor market outcomes for individuals with children relative to those without children
after the HIBEX. The results in Panel C indicate that the main results are robust to the
inclusion of these additional controls, with the exception of the conditional benefit-eligible
employment outcome in column 5.
Finally, Panel D in Table 7 presents the estimates of the main outcomes of interest
for the subsample of individuals for which there was no change in the payroll tax (those
with earnings below the 2.5 BPC eligibility cut-off - see Section 2.3). As discussed above,
the comparison between eligible and ineligible individuals in this group has the advantage
that, while eligible employees were potential beneficiaries of the benefit extension, neither
group faced an increase in payroll tax contributions. The estimated coefficients of interest
are similar in magnitude to those from the baseline estimates in Table 2, although only
the coefficient of the reform on the benefit-elegible employment outcome is statistically
significant at the 10 percent level; the outcome on underreporting is significant at the 5
percent level. Since this group did not see an increase in payroll tax, we should expect a
larger effect, and this is in fact the case: relative to the pre-treatment dependent variable
mean of 0.46, the effect on eligible employment for the whole sample of 0.0162 (Table 2,
column 1) represents an increase of about 3.5 percent. The corresponding pre-treatment
mean is 0.11, so the 0.0168 increase (Table 7, panel D, column 1) implies a much greater
effect in relative terms (about 15.3 percent greater). The fact that the estimates are still
robust for this subgroup reinforces the identification strategy, indicating that the increase
in payroll tax for the control group is not a concern. The analysis for this subgroup, how-
ever, lacks statistical power: the samples for these alternative comparison and treatment
groups are substantially smaller and, unlike the analysis for the full sample in Tables 4
and 5, this one does not allow for a meaningful analysis by subgroup.
In general, these robustness and specification tests suggest that changes in the com-
position of the treatment and comparison groups did not introduce a spurious correlation
between changes in the outcomes before and after the reform.
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7 Financial implications and discussion
The HIBEX was designed to increase the scope of health insurance coverage for the de-
pendent children of registered employees. As depicted in Figure 1, take-up of the benefit
was very high, triggering a large increase in government expenditure in the form of private
health insurance premiums for newly eligible children. Part of this expense was offset by
a reduction in the costs of the public health system. In terms of revenues, the reform had
several implications. On the one hand, tax collection increased. An increase in contri-
butions for most registered workers generated higher payroll tax receipts. On the other
hand, in addition to this direct or mechanical effect, the reform also resulted in an increase
in registered employment. This behavioral effect generated both higher tax collection and
higher expenditures. Finally, the results discussed above also indicate that the reform
had a dual effect on tax evasion in the labor market: registered employment increased,
but underreporting of salaried earnings increased as well. The following pages discuss the
overall impact of the reform on government finance due to each of these effects, which are
summarised in Table 8. This estimate of the fiscal incidence of the reform is restricted to
individuals in the survey sample, and it relies on a series of assumptions.27
The first step for computing the fiscal incidence of the reform is to estimate the me-
chanical changes in tax revenue and expenditure. Childless registered workers did not
imply any additional expenditure after the reform, but they represented higher revenues.
The fraction of the payroll tax allocated to health insurance for these workers increased
by 1.5 percentage points. Based on an average monthly salary of UYU 12,889.2 for the
67,122 childless registered employees working 25 hours or more per week in 2007, annual
government revenue increased by UYU 155.7 million from this source (row A.1, column 6
- all values in monthly UYU are multiplied by 12 to obtain the results in annual terms).28
The second mechanical effect follows the change in payroll taxes and healthcare in-
surance benefits for the 159,250 individuals with children in benefit-eligible employment
in the pre-reform year, 2007. In terms of revenue, based on the average taxable earning
of UYU 12,689.2 per month in 2007 for this group, the 3 percentage point increase in
health insurance contributions resulted in an increase in revenue of UYU 727.5 million
(row A.2, column 6). On the expenditure side, the reform generated an additional ex-
penditure in the form of health insurance premiums paid by the SIA for the children of
these workers in 2008 at UYU 603 per child per month (in 2007 prices). The total number
of children covered by the reform was 242,072, which resulted in an additional expendi-
ture of UYU 1,750,7 million (row D.1, column 6). However, a substantial fraction of the
27The values of all parameters correspond to the year 2007, except when indicated otherwise (for instance,
the parameters that changed with the reform (contributions) or new parameters, such as the insurance
premiums paid by the SIA, which are based on figures from 2008). Information on expenditure per
individual, such as health insurance premiums, are taken from administrative sources (Banco de Previsio´n
Social, 2008; 2009; Ministerio de Salud Pu´blica, 2010a). All monetary values in UYU are expressed in
2007 prices.
28As a further simplifying assumption, the analysis does not take into account the level of underreporting
for those already in registered employment before the reform (rows A.1 and A.2), which stayed roughly
constant. This would complicate the analysis and require further assumptions, which would, in turn, result
in somewhat lower figures for tax revenue in column 6 of rows A.1 and A.2. The analysis highlights instead
the reform-induced behavioral changes in underreporting of earnings for workers at small firms (row B.2).
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children were covered by the public health sector in 2007 at an average cost of UYU 350
per child per month, so this shift in their health insurance arrangements from public to
private amounted to savings of UYU 683.1 million (row D.2, column 6) and resulted in a
substantially lower net increase in expenditures.
The changes discussed thus far are limited to mechanical effects. The evidence in this
paper, however, indicates the presence of behavioral effects due to the HIBEX, which
has further consequences for government expenditure and tax revenues. The estimates
from Table 2 show that, on average, the HIBEX increased benefit-eligible employment
by 1.62 percentage points, a 3.5 percent increase with respect to the pre-reform levels of
2007. This represented an increase of 5,574 (0.035×159,250) in the number of workers
in benefit-eligible employment and 8,473 newly eligible children (average of 1.52 children
per registered employee in 2007). Computing the annual premiums for adults (UYU 809)
and children (UYU 604) paid by the SIA in 2008, the additional annual expenditure in
health insurance attributable to this behavioral effect is UYU 115.4 million (rows E.1 and
E.2, column 6). However, 4,450 of the newly covered adults and 5,692 of their children
were covered by the public sector before the reform (based on the 2007 coverage of the
public healthcare system, 67 percent for parents and 81.5 percent for children), so this
shift in healthcare insurance arrangements from public to private reduced public-sector
expenditure by UYU 350 per individual per month for a total of UYU 43 million (row E.3,
column 6).
In terms of revenue, the increase of 5,574 in benefit-eligible registered workers implied
higher contributions to the health insurance fund for an annual total of UYU 93.4 (row
B.1), yielded by an average monthly earning per worker of UYU 12,689.2, the additional
pre-reform employer contributions (5 percent of earnings), the additional pre-reform em-
ployee contribution (3 percent), and the increase in the payroll tax rate due to the reform
for this group (an additional 3 percent of earnings).
Finally, also in terms of revenue, an additional factor is the increase in underreport-
ing of salaried earnings for registered employees at small firms. It can be assumed that
earnings were underreported by 25 percent, which represents the middle point between
average earnings for registered employees at small firms and the minimum wage. Table
6, Panel B, indicates that the reform increased underreporting by 4.09 percentage points
for benefit-eligible employees at small firms, which represented an increase of 24 percent
in the incidence of underreporting with respect to the pre-reform period. Of a total of
45,042 registered employees with children working at small firms in 2007, 7,657 (17 per-
cent) declared underreported earnings, and the average monthly earning for this group in
2007 was UYU 8,231. Taking into account the 3 percent increase in contributions, tax
revenue from this effect fell by UYU 1.4 million. A similar analysis applies to the subset
of parents who entered benefit-eligible employment in small firms after the reform (about
28 percent of the original 5,574 workers). A total of 332 of these 1,576 new workers under-
reported earnings. Including the original health insurance contribution of 8 percent and
the additional 3 percent due to the reform, this implied an additional fall in (potential)
tax collection of UYU 0.9 million. Overall, tax collection fell by UYU 2.3 million due to
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the behavioral response of underreporting salaried earnings (row B.2, column 6).29
To sum up, on the basis of these assumptions, the direct or mechanical effect of the
reform implies an increase in the budget deficit of ([1,750.7-683.1] - [155.7+727.5]) =
UYU 184.5 million. Furthermore, the behavioral impact of the reform actually implied
an additional total effect of ([54.1+61.3-43.0] - [93.4-2.3]) = UYU -18.7 million, i.e., a
reduction in the budget deficit. This implies that the increase in tax collection through
the increase in the number of registered workers more than compensated for the additional
public expenditure incurred by covering the health insurance premiums of those individuals
and their families. Another relevant conclusion is that the additional revenue created by
the increase in registered employment following the reform, UYU 93.4 million, exceeded
by a factor of about 40 the loss of revenue of UYU 2.3 million due to the higher levels
of underreporting induced by the HIBEX; the increase in the intensive margin of payroll
tax evasion was of a second order when compared to the gains from the reduction in its
extensive margin.
Taken together, the results indicate that the HIBEX increased the budget deficit by
(1,140.1-974) = UYU 165.8 million or USD 10.5 million at the 2010 PPP adjusted exchange
rate, which represents 0.030 percent of Uruguay’s GDP in 2007 and 0.28 percent of total
government expenditure on health care for that year. This additional 0.030 percent of GDP
more than tripled the coverage of explicit health insurance for children.30 While the specific
figures depend on a series of assumptions, they provide suggestive evidence on the relative
magnitude of the different effects at play. There are probably other important positive
effects in terms of children’s health and other spillovers from registered employment (access
to pensions and other benefits), which should be included in a full cost-benefit analysis
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
8 Conclusions
This paper studied the impact of a reform in Uruguay’s social insurance system that
extended the coverage of a health insurance benefit from registered employees to their de-
pendent children. This extended benefit introduced a new incentive for parents to take up
registered employment. The evidence confirms that individuals reacted as predicted, with
a substantial increase in benefit-eligible employment for parents as compared to childless
individuals. Also as predicted, single parents, parents with several children, and parents
with younger children entered registered employment at a higher rate. For individuals
29This total is yielded by the UYU 1.4 million (0.24×7,657×0.25×8,231×0.03) and the 332
(1,572×0.17×[1+0.24]) new underreporters for UYU 0.9 million (332×0.25×8,231×0.11).
30The total number of children enrolled in the program after the reform in 2008 was 250,545 (Table
8, D.1+E.2). A first part of this total corresponds to the 79,440 children of registered employees who
were already enrolled in private health insurance because their parents paid for it before the reform. The
second component corresponds to the mechanical effect for children of registered employees. Before the
reform, there were 162,632 children of registered employees who used the public health sector, and who
then enrolled in private health insurance because of the reform (row D.2). The third component is the
behavioral response. Parents who entered benefit eligible employment and enrolled their eligible children
implied 8,473 newly covered children (row E.1). Compared to the baseline coverage of 79,440 children, the
behavioral response represented an increase of about 10.7% in the coverage of explicit health insurance.
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in couples, responses to the reform depended on their partner’s employment’s benefit-
eligibility. The increase in benefit-eligible employment was driven by both reductions in
the number of those not working and (for single parents) by shifts from unregistered to
registered employment. The results indicate a complex pattern of tax-evasion responses
in the labor market following the policy change. The reform also induced reactions along
a further margin of adjustment in tax compliance, with higher levels of underreporting of
taxable earnings for benefit-eligible registered employees working at small firms. A fiscal
incidence analysis of the reform indicates that the payroll tax increases associated with
the benefit extension managed to cover most but not all of the increase in expenditure.
Moreover, the reform’s behavioral effect amounted to a small, but relevant, fraction of
the total change in the budget deficit. Finally, the increase in revenue from the reform’s
positive effects on registered employment far outweighed the loss in revenue from increased
underreporting of salaried earnings.
The analysis indicates that additional tax evasion margins of response mean complex
trade-offs for workers and governments in the context of tax and benefit systems. In
terms of tax evasion, the decision is not simply between off-the-book versus registered
employment, but between full non-compliance, full compliance, and on-the-book salaried
employment with under-the-table payments. These results confirm the insight that work
incentives do not necessarily operate within the framework of the law and that the design
of social insurance systems should take into account these additional dimensions.
The implications of this analysis are relevant not only for developing economies with
large informal labor forces. The policy consequences are also relevant for OECD countries,
most of which have experienced an increase in their shadow economies over the past two
decades (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Schneider, 2005); they may well face trade-offs similar
to those described for Uruguay, at least for part of their labor forces. Moreover, it is
necessary to understand the channels through which the tax and benefit system yields
changes in evasion behavior in the context of salaried employment. For instance, it would
be important to distinguish between situations where the employer and the employee
collude to evade taxes from settings where the firm engages in unilateral evasion. Third-
party information reporting (which has been highlighted as an effective measure to induce
compliance) and other specifics of tax law and implementation details may also play an
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All individuals ≥ 18 Children < 18 Children < 18 covered by HIBEX
Policy Implentation: January 2008
Semester
Note: The sample corresponds to the Encuesta Continua de Hogares from the 2nd semester of 2004 to the 2nd semester of 2010.
Figure 2: Difference in benefit-eligible employment rates (registered and working 25 hours or more per
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Difference  in employment rate
(single parents minus childless adults)
95% confidence interval Average difference
Policy Implentation: January 2008
Note: The sample contains individuals aged 25 to 55 and corresponds to the Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) from the
2nd semester of 2004 to the 2nd semester of 2010. The set of controls includes the individual’s age, gender, head of household
status, education level, number of children, head of household status and marital status.
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Table 1: Summary statistics (Encuesta Continua de Hogares, ECH) 2004-2010 and payroll tax contri-
butions for social insurance benefits.
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Panel A. Descritptive statistics
Sample
N (Total=97,552) 13,402 9,756 45,973 28,421
Share 0.14 0.10 0.47 0.29
Individual characteristics
Age 39.66 9.93 39.62 9.89 38.49 7.62 38.56 7.58 0.117
High school or less 0.72 0.45 0.72 0.45 0.85 0.35 0.86 0.35 0.002
Some college or more 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.35 -0.002
Male 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.005
Head of household 0.63 0.48 0.65 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.012
Married 0.65 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.89 0.32 0.87 0.33 0.013*
Number of children aged 0 - 10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.12 0.99 1.06 0.95 -0.061***
Number of children aged 11 - 17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.83 0.81 0.85 0.013*
Number of  children > 18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.60 0.26 0.57 -0.016***
Total number of children 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.20 1.13 2.14 1.10 -0.064***
Region
Montevideo 0.71 0.46 0.69 0.46 0.59 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.024***
North 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 -0.007*
Center - North 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 -0.007
Center - South 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.26 -0.002
South 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.33 -0.007
Firm size
< 10  employees 0.41 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.38 0.49 0.014
10-49 employees 0.22 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42 -0.009
> 49 employess 0.36 0.48 0.43 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.39 0.49 -0.005
Sector
Agriculture 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.001
Industry 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.005
Manufacturing 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.26 -0.010**
Construction 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.25 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.005
Trade 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.016**
Transport/communications 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 -0.012**
Finance/professional 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.26 -0.009
Education/health 0.19 0.40 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.005
Personal services 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.31 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.34 -0.001
Labor market and tax evasion outcomes
Benefit-eligible employment 0.58 0.49 0.67 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.016*
Not working 0.21 0.41 0.16 0.36 0.33 0.47 0.25 0.43 -0.020***
Unregistered employment 0.16 0.36 0.12 0.32 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.34 0.005
Registered employment 0.63 0.48 0.72 0.45 0.51 0.50 0.62 0.49 0.014*
Benefit-eligible empl. | reg. empl. 0.92 0.26 0.92 0.26 0.91 0.29 0.92 0.28 0.007
Underreporting earnings to SIA 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.01
Panel B. Payroll tax contributions to the Social Security Administration
Health insurance benefit 8 9.5 8 11
Employee 3 4.5 3 6
Employer 5 5 5 5
Other social insurance benefits 22.75 22.75 22.75 22.75
Employee 15.125 15.125 15.125 15.125
Employer 7.625 7.625 7.625 7.625
Total 30.75 32.25 30.75 33.75
Childless individuals Parents with children < 18 Difference 
in 
differences
Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
Notes: SD denotes the standard deviation. “Pre-reform” refers to the period from the 2nd semester of 2004 to the 2nd semester
2007. “Post-reform” denotes the period from the 1st semester of 2009 to the 2nd semester of 2010. “Difference in differences”
refers to the impact coefficient estimated by running a regression as in Equation 1 (without controls) on each variable in
Panel A with Huber-White robust standard errors. “Parents with children <18” includes all adults in the relevant age range
with at least one child under the age of 18 who may or may not have older children. The sample includes individuals aged
25-55 and contemplates the variables of benefit-eligible employment, not working, unregistered and registered employment
(97,552 observations); only those working in registered employment are included for benefit-eligible employment conditional
on registered employment (56,707 observations). For underreporting of salaried earnings, the sample includes salaried private-
sector registered employees aged 25-55 from 2006 onwards (50,669 observations). Means are weighted by ECH sampling weights.
The payroll tax contributions correspond to December 2007 (“Pre-reform”) and 2008 (“Post-reform”). The “Health insurance
benefit” includes contributions for both sickness benefit and health insurance coverage. The change in contributions corresponds
to registered employees with salaried earnings higher than 2.5 BPC (threshold level for benefits and contributions - UYU 1,775
in 2008). Payroll tax contributions for registered workers with salaried earnings below 2.5 BPC remained unchanged after the
reform. “Other social insurance benefits” pension contributions and contributions to the “Fondo de Reconversio´n Laboral”
(labor reallocation fund).
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2: Effect of the health insurance benefit extension on labor market outcomes. Difference in
differences estimates.











AnyChildren*PostReform 0.0162** -0.0162** 0.001 0.0152** 0.0107**
[0.0075] [0.0063] [0.0058] [0.0073] [0.0052]
AnyChildren 0.0239*** -0.0292*** -0.0052 0.0344*** -0.0132***
[0.0066] [0.0059] [0.0055] [0.0066] [0.0048]
Observations 97,552 97,552 97,552 97,552 56,707
R
2 0.26 0.24 0.05 0.25 0.17
Dependent variable mean 0.46 0.33 0.16 0.51 0.91
Notes: The sample includes individuals aged 25-55 (all individuals for columns 1-4, conditional on registered employment for
column 5). The data corresponds to the Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) from the 2nd semester of 2004 to the 2nd
semester 2007 and from the 1st semester of 2009 to the 2nd semester of 2010. “Benefit-eligible employment” refers to registered
employment with 25 hours or more per week. The “AnyChildren” variable equals 1 if the individual has at least one child under
the age of 18 and 0 otherwise. The “Post-reform” variable equals 1 for the period 2009-2010 and 0 otherwise. The estimated
coefficients correspond to the regression in Equation 1. The regressions are estimated as linear probability models. The controls
include the number of children; the number of children aged 0-5; dummy variables for: age (6 categories), gender, head of the
household status, marital status, educational level (6 categories), region of residence (19 categories), firm size (5 categories),
industry (9 categories) (the final two are only included in the benefit-eligible registered employment conditional on registered
employment regression), and semester (11 categories). The controls also include interactions between age and education groups
and number of children, and time and region of residence. Regressions are weighted by ECH sampling weights. The reported
means for the dependent variables correspond to the pre-reform period (2004-2007).
Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3: Effect of the health insurance benefit extension on labor market outcomes. Dynamic specifica-
tion of the difference in differences model.












2010 0.0249** -0.0222** 0.0053 0.017 0.0158**
[0.0114] [0.0095] [0.0084] [0.0110] [0.0077]
2009 0.0260** -0.0064 -0.0135 0.0199* 0.0106
[0.0114] [0.0094] [0.0084] [0.0110] [0.0076]
2007 0.0012 0.0009 0.0024 -0.0033 0.0053
[0.0110] [0.0091] [0.0083] [0.0107] [0.0075]
2006 0.0087 -0.0061 -0.0014 0.0075 -0.0047
[0.0111] [0.0094] [0.0083] [0.0109] [0.0076]
2005 0.0173 0.0065 -0.0083 0.0018 0.0154
[0.0147] [0.0128] [0.0122] [0.0145] [0.0109]
2004 0.0211 0.0222 -0.0339** 0.0118 0.0039
[0.0194] [0.0168] [0.0166] [0.0192] [0.0139]
Observations 117,001 117,001 117,001 117,001 68,515
Notes: The sample includes individuals aged 25-55 (all individuals for columns 1-4, conditional on registered employment for
column 5). The data corresponds to the Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) from the 2nd semester of 2004 to the 2nd semester
of 2010. Unlike all the other tables in the paper, the estimates presented here include the two semesters of 2008, the year of
the refom. The omitted year category is 2008. “Benefit-eligible employment” refers to registered employment with 25 hours or
more per week. The “AnyChildren” variable equals 1 if the individual has at least one child under the age of 18 years and 0
otherwise. The “Post-reform” variable equals 1 for the period 2009-2010 and 0 otherwise. The estimated coefficients correspond
to the regression in Equation 1. The regressions are estimated as linear probability models. The controls include the number
of children; the number of children aged 0-5; dummy variables for: age (6 categories), gender, head of the household status,
marital status, education (6 categories), region of residence (19 categories), firm size (5 categories), industry (9 categories) (the
final two are only included in the benefit-eligible registered employment conditional on registered employment regression), and
semester (11 categories). The controls also include interactions between age and education groups and number of children,
time and region of residence, and AnyChildren and year dummies. Regressions are weighted by ECH sampling weights. The
reported means for the dependent variables correspond to the pre-reform period (2004-2007).
Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Effect of the health insurance benefit extension on labor market outcomes by age and number
of children. Difference in differences estimates.












One child only, aged 0-10 0.0246** -0.0126 -0.0119 0.0245** 0.0066
[0.0100] [0.0085] [0.0075] [0.0098] [0.0069]
One child only, aged 11-17 0.0084 -0.012 0.0026 0.0095 0.0113
[0.0104] [0.0092] [0.0081] [0.0103] [0.0078]
Two children or more, 0.0183** -0.0184** 0.0031 0.0153* 0.0116*
youngest aged 0-10 [0.0083] [0.0073] [0.0066] [0.0082] [0.0060]
Two children or more, 0.0023 -0.0212* 0.0174 0.0038 0.0123
youngest aged 11-17 [0.0133] [0.0119] [0.0110] [0.0132] [0.0103]
Observations 97,552 97,552 97,552 97,552 56,707
Dependent variable mean 0.46 0.33 0.16 0.51 0.91
Notes: The sample includes individuals aged 25-55 (all individuals for columns 1-4, conditional on registered employment for
column 5). The data corresponds to the Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) from the 2nd semester of 2004 to the 2nd
semester 2007 and from the 1st semester of 2009 to the 2nd semester of 2010. “Benefit-eligible employment” refers to registered
employment with 25 hours or more per week. The dependent variables and controls are the same as those detailed in the notes
to Table 2. The regressions are estimated as linear probability models. The rows report the coefficients estimated for each
number–by–age range of children group from regressions as in Equation 2. Regressions are weighted by ECH sampling weights.
The reported means for the dependent variables correspond to the pre-reform period (2004-2007).
Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
37
Table 5: Effect of the health insurance benefit extension on labor market outcomes of individuals by
marital status and partner’s employment status. Difference in differences estimates.












AnyChildren*PostReform 0.0530*** -0.0207* -0.0417*** 0.0624*** 0.0017
[0.0158] [0.0124] [0.0137] [0.0153] [0.0127]
Observations 17,340 17,340 17,340 17,340 10,387
Dependent variable mean 0.38 0.27 0.29 0.44 0.86
Panel B. Individuals with partners
AnyChildren*PostReform 0.0102 -0.0112 0.0047 0.0064 0.0114*
[0.0088] [0.0078] [0.0065] [0.0086] [0.0062]
Observations 80,212 80,212 80,212 80,212 46,320
Dependent variable mean 0.47 0.33 0.15 0.52 0.92
P-value singles = couples 0.0177** 0.5173 0.0020*** 0.0014*** 0.4991
Panel C. By partner's employment status
Reform's effect on those 0.0168* -0.0082 -0.0035 0.0117 0.0125*
with ineligible partners [0.0093] [0.0082] [0.0070] [0.0091] [0.0065]
Reform's effect on those -0.0012 -0.0155* 0.0182** -0.0027 0.0090
with eligible partners [0.0099] [0.009] [0.0071] [0.0097] [0.0071]
Observations 80,212 80,212 80,212 80,212 46,320
Dependent variable mean 0.47 0.33 0.15 0.52 0.92
Notes: The sample includes individuals aged 25-55 (all individuals for columns 1-4, conditional on registered employment for
column 5). The data corresponds to the Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) from the 2nd semester of 2004 to the 2nd
semester of 2007 and from the 1st semester of 2009 to the 2nd semester of 2010. “Benefit-eligible employment” refers to
registered employment with 25 hours or more per week. The dependent variables and controls are the same as those detailed in
the notes to Table 2. The regressions are estimated as linear probability models. The specification is similar to that of Equation
1 with two exceptions: it includes an indicator for the employment status of the individual’s partner and its interaction in order
to capture the reform’s impact (AnyChildren*PostReform). Panels A and B report estimates from a regression as Equation 1
for single individuals in the sample and for partnered indivdiuals, respectively. Panel C reports the estimates of the HIBEX’s
impact on partnered individuals conditioning on their partner’s employment status, that is, holding a benefit-eligible registered
job (“Partner eligible”) or not (“Partner ineligible”). Regressions are weighted by ECH sampling weights. The reported means
for the dependent variables correspond to the pre-reform period (2004-2007).
Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 6: Effect of the health insurance benefit extension on underreporting of salaried earnings, overall
and by firm size. Difference in differences estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All  registered 
employees
Small firms  
(< 10 employees) 




Panel A. All registered employees
AnyChildren*PostReform 0.0073 0.0342** -0.0052 -0.0031
[0.0061] [0.0152] [0.0131] [0.0060]
AnyChildren -0.0083 -0.0213 -0.0034 -0.0033
[0.0059] [0.0138] [0.0125] [0.0060]
Observations 50,669 15,151 13,035 22,483
R
2 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02
Dependent variable mean 0.10 0.18 0.11 0.04
Panel B. Registered employees working ≥ 25 h
AnyChildren*PostReform 0.0093 0.0409** -0.0012 -0.0049
[0.0064] [0.0166] [0.0136] [0.0061]
AnyChildren -0.0105* -0.0262* -0.0042 -0.004
[0.0062] [0.0151] [0.0130] [0.0062]
Observations 46,222 12,681 12,175 21,366
R
2 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.02
Dependent variable mean 0.10 0.17 0.11 0.04
Panel C. Registered employeess working < 25 h
AnyChildren*PostReform -0.0128 -0.0051 -0.0799 0.0471
[0.0224] [0.0380] [0.0498] [0.0287]
AnyChildren 0.0183 0.0143 0.0266 0.0202
[0.0218] [0.0346] [0.0512] [0.0307]
Observations 4,447 2,470 860 1,117
R
2 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.24
Dependent variable mean 0.15 0.22 0.09 0.03
Notes: The sample includes employed individuals aged 25-55. The data corresponds to the Encuesta Continua de Hogares
(ECH) from the 1st semester of 2006 to the 2nd semester 2007 and from the 1st semester of 2009 to the 2nd semester of 2010.
The dependent variable is the underreporting of salaried earnings as reported by the individual herself. The controls are the
same as those detailed in the notes to Table 2. The regressions are estimated as linear probability models. Regressions are
weighted by ECH sampling weights. The reported means for the dependent variables correspond to the pre-reform period
(2004-2007).
Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 7: Effect of the health insurance benefit extension on labor market outcomes. Robustness and
specification checks.














Panel A. With time-cohort effects
AnyChildren*PostReform 0.0144* -0.0175*** 0.0022 0.0153** 0.0085 0.0342**
[0.0077] [0.0065] [0.0060] [0.0075] [0.0054] [0.0152]
Observations 97,552 97,552 97,552 97,552 56,707 15,151
Panel B. With AnyChildren/covariates interactions
AnyChildren*PostReform 0.0132* -0.0122* -0.0004 0.0126* 0.0111** 0.0332**
[0.0075] [0.0063] [0.0058] [0.0073] [0.0053] [0.0153]
Observations 97,552 97,552 97,552 97,552 56,707 15,151
Panel C. With PostReform/covariates interactions
AnyChildren*PostReform 0.0173** -0.0165** -0.0017 0.0182** 0.0072 0.0398**
[0.0081] [0.0070] [0.0063] [0.0079] [0.0059] [0.0165]
Observations 97,552 97,552 97,552 97,552 56,707 15,151
Panel D. Individuals with unchanged payroll tax
AnyChildren*PostReform 0.0168* -0.0118 -0.0039 0.0157 0.0107 0.0915**
[0.0100] [0.0143] [0.0119] [0.0116] [0.0272] [0.0403]
Observations 40,803 40,803 40,803 40,803 7,023 3,127
Notes: The sample includes individuals aged 25-55 (all individuals for columns 1-4, conditional on registered employment for
columns 5 and 6). The data corresponds to the Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) for the 2nd semester of 2004 to the
2nd semester of 2007 and from the 1st semester of 2009 to the 2nd semester of 2010. For the regressions in Panel A, the data
corresponds to the period that spans from the 2nd semester of 2004 to the 2nd semester of 2007. The data for the regressions
in column 6 starts in the 1st semester of 2006. “Benefit-eligible employment” refers to registered employment with 25 hours or
more per week. The dependent variables and controls are the same as those detailed in the notes to Table 2. The regressions
are estimated as linear probability models. Panel A reports results with a full set of birth cohort-semester interactions. Panel
B reports results with the AnyChildren indicator interacted with demographic controls. Panel C reports the results from a
specification with the PostReform indicator interacted with demographic controls. Panel D reports results by restricting the
sample to individuals with salaried (nominal) earnings below 2.5 BPC (the regression sample includes those with zero earnings).
The reported means for the dependent variables correspond to the pre-reform period (2004-2007).
Huber-White robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
40
Table 8: Net impact of the health insurance benefit extension on the government budget: Mechanical


















A - Mechanical effect 
A. 1 - Childless individuals 0.015 67,122 12,889 155.7
A. 2 - Parents 0.03 159,250 12,689 727.5
B - Behavioral effect 
B. 1 - Parents 0.08 0.03 5,574 12,689 93.4
B. 2 - Underreporting (small firms) 0.08 0.03 7,657 332 8,231 -2.3













D - Mechanical effect 
D.1 - Children acquiring the benefit 242,072 603 1,750.7
D.2 - Reduced public sector exp. on children 162,632 -350 -683.1
E - Behavioral effect 
E. 1 - Parents entering benefit-eligible empl. 5,574 809 54.1
E. 2 - Children of parents entering empl. 8,473 603 61.3
E. 3 - Parents+children leaving the public sector 10,232 -350 -43.0
G - Total  (D.1+D.2+E.1+E.2 +E.3) 1,140.1
Budget defict, mechanical (D1+D2-A1-A2) 184.5
Net behavioral effect (E1+E2+E3-B1-B2) -18.7
Total effect (G-C) 165.8
Budget defit/Government expenditures on  health insurance (2007) 0.284%
Budget defit/GDP (2007) 0.030%
Notes: The mechanical effects correspond to the changes in revenue due to the changes in payroll tax contribution rates after
the reform and to changes in expenditure due to the payment of health insurance premiums and the fall in the use of the
publichealth system by those who enrolled in the new benefit after the reform. The behavioral effects take into account the
impact of the reform on labor market and tax evasion outcomes. See Section 7 for more details.
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